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Insurance law in the eighteenth century is often seen as a perfect illustration of the way commercial law emerged from a relationship between the judges and the merchants, with Lord Mansfield at the centre, drawing on mercantile custom. This tends to subordinate the role of both the merchants and Parliament. Yet, merchants were involved in shaping the law not just as witnesses and jurors in Mansfield’s court but also through their promotion of, and opposition to, legislation, and through the way business was conducted and disputes resolved. 

Insurance – Mansfield – Legislation - History

1. Mansfield and Commercial Law
1. 
Insurance law in the eighteenth century seems to provide a perfect illustration of the way commercial law was constructed and shaped by the judges, with Lord Mansfield in the vanguard: ‘it fell to Lord Mansfield to rationalize and elucidate the legal principles of insurance. The coherence of his efforts was one of his greatest achievements.’​[1]​ There are, however, some problems with this depiction. It largely ignores legislation even though the eighteenth century was awash with statutes that at least touched on insurance.​[2]​ Furthermore, while the role played by merchants, brokers, and underwriters in law making is given emphasis, their contribution is subordinated because, while they may, as witnesses and special jurors, have provided the clay, Mansfield is shown as controlling their participation, and fashioning the finished pot. Yet, the market makers and policyholders also influenced the law through their impact on legislation, and by manipulating, avoiding, or simply ignoring rules. This paper does not dispute the importance of the courts in the development of insurance law, it seeks only to suggest that there are other perspectives on law making between the South Sea Bubble Act 1720 and its repeal in 1825. It also discusses the reasons why particular legislation was passed, which may help to an understanding of provisions that are sometimes obscure.
 
2. Bubble and Taxes
A. Insurance and the South Sea Bubble
The history of insurance legislation starts long before the eighteenth century. The Merchant Assurances Act 1601 was part of an attempt to establish an interlocking system of policy registration, dispute resolution, and substantive rules, which the City of London authorities - prompted by the Privy Council - had begun in the 1570s.​[3]​ This system was developed by merchants, but it foundered under pressure from lawyers anxious to maintain their control over lucrative litigation, and from the merchants themselves, who wished to delay actions, or were dissatisfied with either the powers or outcomes of the London system. The statute of 1601, another in 1662, and even a proclamation by James II sought to reinvigorate this structure,​[4]​ but it barely survived that king, and the market settled into arbitration, negotiation, and some litigation.​[5]​ Nevertheless, all this effort indicates a market sufficiently significant to warrant regulation long before Edward Lloyd began brewing coffee. The preamble to the 1601 act explained that the importance to public policy of insurance lay in its contribution to ‘the general Wealth of the Realm, her Majesty's Customs, and the Strength of Shipping’ by allowing losses to lie ‘rather easily upon many than heavily upon few, and rather upon them that adventure not than those that do adventure, whereby all Merchants, especially of the younger Sort, are allured to venture more willingly and more freely'.​[6]​ 
It is no coincidence that the Tudor structure finally broke up as this symbiotic relationship between insurance, commerce, and shipping acquired greater significance with the accession of William III and Mary II in 1689. The state set about challenging France and extending its empire, and international trade developed. These ambitions required novel methods of government and commercial funding, leading to what has been called the Financial Revolution, with innovations, including the National Debt, the Bank of England and the stock exchange, as well as various speculative, and even fraudulent, projects.​[7]​ Marine insurance grew, and new products, such as fire and life policies, became more widely available, but the term ‘insurance’ had no clear meaning, and it came to be used to conceal swindles, perhaps because it bestowed an air of solidity and integrity. In 1710-11, subscriptions were invited for 'insurance' schemes that promised a payment on marriage or childbirth. These were quickly prohibited, although why almost alone they were chosen for legislative treatment is unclear.​[8]​ 
This revolutionary period hit disaster when the South Sea Company's shares tumbled in 1720, ruining many and exposing the corruption of others. Yet, the marine insurance market had already survived a severe test in 1693 when the French sank or captured some 90 merchant ships worth over £1 million in the Bay of Lagos. Many underwriters went bankrupt after the House of Lords rejected a compromise embodied in the Merchant Insurers Bill, apparently because of opposition from creditors.​[9]​ Nevertheless, the market recovered. Investors were attracted to underwriting by the high premiums that could be charged in wartime. At the same time, they were able to reduce their risk by subscribing for only a part of a policy, not agreeing to cover the losses of other subscribers, underwriting a large number of policies, and requiring ships to travel in convoys protected by the Navy.​[10]​ The war reinforced the view that insurance played a fundamental role in public policy as well as commerce by encouraging merchants to run French blockades. While peace brought lower premiums, and merchants may have been more willing to self-insure, the market continued to prosper. In part this may have been because the crash of 1720 had removed the stock market as an option for investors, but it also appeared that more foreign merchants came to London for insurance: 
the cheapness of insurances, and eagerness of foreigners to insure here, reciprocally contribute to each other; we are often applied to, because we insure at an easy rate, and we can insure at an easy rate, because we are often applied to. Nor is the cheapness of… [British] insurance, the only motive to the preference which it preserves among foreigners, who are induced to apply to this nation, by the reputation which our merchants have deservedly gained, for probity and punctuality.​[11]​
B. The Bubble Act 1720
The importance of marine insurance was acknowledged in the 'Bloody Code'. This refers to more than 200 capital offences created as part of the post-1689 constitutional settlement, which was based on a reconceptualization of property that eventually included new forms such as the monetary instruments created during the Financial Revolution. In 1717, it was made a felony wilfully to destroy a ship ‘to the prejudice of any person or persons that shall underwrite any policy or policies of insurance thereon’.​[12]​ Later, this was extended to arson with intent to defraud by a portmanteau statute, introduced by Lord Ellenborough CJ in 1803.​[13]​
	The bright prospects offered by marine insurance also brought an attempt to control access to the market. The Bubble Act 1720 was passed shortly before share prices collapsed, but, in part, was a response to the large number of new companies that were being formed without a royal charter.​[14]​ It banned new joint-stock companies, unless incorporated by charter or act of parliament (ss 18-21), and it was assumed this would channel investment into the South Sea Company, which was involved in a scheme for reducing the National Debt. But the act had another purpose, and that was to confer various privileges on the Royal Exchange Assurance Company ('the Royal') and the London Assurance Company (‘the London’), which had recently been granted charters. The justification for incorporating these companies when the policy was to restrict the market for the benefit of the South Sea Company was that the importance of marine insurance required it to be placed on a stronger foundation than offered by the subscription market. This was supported by an allegation that the failure of 150 private underwriters in the previous few years had weakened the market, forcing merchants to seek insurance in Holland.​[15]​ The companies would provide permanence, continuity, and more choice for merchants, and their capital reserves would bring greater confidence about claims payment than the subscription market, which depended on the uncertain resources of private underwriters. Yet, the integrity of the Royal and the London was in question. There were allegations of bribery involving the Crown’s law officers, and, while these were rejected, the companies seem to have been given favourable treatment because they had powerful supporters, and, more importantly, because each promised £300,000 to the Crown under a plan devised by Robert Walpole. But when the speculative bubble burst a few months later, and the prospects for the new insurers plummeted, they were excused a large part of the sums promised, and permitted to diversify into life and fire insurance. 
The 1720 act banned corporations, societies and partnerships, other than the Royal and the London, from offering marine insurance (s 12), and made forgery of the common seals or policies of the Royal and the London a capital offence (s 13). It did, however, have some features that look advanced even 300 years later. The Royal and the London were ‘to cause such a stock of ready money to be provided and reserved, as shall be sufficient to answer, from time to time, all just demands upon their policies of assurance for any losses whatsoever which shall happen’ (s 4), and the failure to pay a claim rendered them liable for double damages secured on company assets (s 3). These were doubtless intended to emphasize the alleged advantages of the companies over the subscription market, but proved mere gossamer: the first was nullified by the lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the second modified, and then repealed.​[16]​ 
Companies, such as Sun Fire and Amicable, which had been incorporated before the 1720 act, were permitted to continue, and they joined the Royal and the London in successfully opposing the incorporation of new insurance companies as infringing their privileges. Nevertheless, in a pattern of evasion that will become familiar, this did not prevent determined investors from entering the non-marine insurance market by using a deed of settlement to establish joint-stock companies with limited shareholder liability.​[17]​ These deeds did present difficulties, since all the members of a company had to be joined in litigation, which was cumbersome, and any change in a company's structure needed a private act of parliament, which was slow and expensive.​[18]​ The act excluded companies other than the Royal and the London from marine insurance, but this did not create a duopoly because the subscription market was expressly permitted: ‘any private or particular person or persons shall be at liberty to write or underwrite any [marine] policies’ (s 12). The new companies had not argued for a duopoly.​[19]​ This may have been because members of parliament were unwilling to meddle with the wealthy underwriters who provided capital to the subscription market, or because of fears expressed by the Law Officers, who had opposed any change:
On the whole Matter, it is agreed on all Sides, That the insuring of Ships is of absolute Necessity for the carrying on of Foreign Trade, and that the same has been always managed in the Method the same is now in; and it hath not been made out, That there is no Corporation in Europe for insuring Ships; That the want of a good Method of insuring will be very fatal to Trade; and we are humbly of Opinion, That the making an Experiment in a thing of this Nature, if it should prove amiss, would be of the utmost Consequence to the Trade of this Nation​[20]​ 
There remained concern that the companies would destroy the subscription market by offering insurance at low premiums, and, then, premiums would rise. Furthermore, their apparent access to capital should have given them an advantage, particularly since underwriting partnerships were prohibited. That ban was, however, undermined by the practices in the market of subscribing for distinct parts of a risk, acting together when dealing with claims, and even forming secret partnerships, and by Mansfield's Consolidation Rule, which avoided the need to sue each underwriter by staying all but one of the actions.​[21]​ More importantly, the subscription market benefited from its flexibility, and its growing network of sources of naval information which enabled better risk calculation and competitive pricing. The limitations in the 1720 act were also challenged by the formation of mutual associations of ship owners. Their history and operation are obscure, although they seem to have flourished in wartime when cover became expensive, and in provincial ports where local insurance was limited and access to the London market difficult. The courts took the view that these associations did not breach the prohibition on partnerships as long as members were liable only for their agreed share of any loss, and not that of any member who failed to pay.​[22]​
C. Tax 
While the Bubble Act has generated interest among historians beyond its impact, revenue legislation has been neglected, even though it had a significant influence on business. The importance to the economy and the revenue of controls on imports and exports led to legislation from the 1690s prohibiting insurance on smuggled goods. Insurance on the chance of a government lottery ticket being drawn also became illegal.​[23]​ But most of the legislation on insurance in the eighteenth century was concerned with the attempts by the state to avail itself of the opportunities for gathering revenue from this growing sector.
Stamp duty was introduced in 1694 to raise funds for the war, but proved hard to enforce in the subscription market because it depended on the transaction being recorded in a form that allowed a stamp to be fixed.​[24]​ Brokers, underwriters, and assureds used various methods to avoid duty. The parties would not issue a policy, and, instead, recorded the deal on a slip. This led to statutes making unstamped policies void, and punishing the failure to provide a stamped policy. The market responded with promissory notes made payable if the insured risk occurred. Further legislation rendered these notes void, and imposed penalties if a policy was not issued within three days. That, in turn, led brokers to draft a single stamped policy covering unrelated policyholders and subject matters, which brought further legislation. Legislation also rendered policies null and void if the underwriters and insured were not identified.​[25]​ It was not simply that parties wished to avoid paying duty, the requirement of stamped documents proved inconvenient, since it hampered those who wished to enter into insurance contracts outside the opening hours of the stamp office. Eventually the issue of stamped blank slips was permitted, although it was later said they were never used, and that ordinary slips continued.​[26]​ 
Notable among the arrangements put in place to collect the tax was the Fire Insurance Duty Act 1782 (22 Geo 3 c 48), which obliged fire insurers to obtain a licence from, and supply details of policies to, the Commissioners of Stamp Duty. This was not a means of regulating the industry but merely an attempt to ensure duty was paid, and the Commissioners could only refuse registration if an applicant failed to provide surety for the estimated duty payable on policies within six months.
Stamp duty influenced the conduct and documentation of insurance, even though this was not its main objective. It had other unforeseen outcomes. In 1807, an Old Bailey jury found that Edward Gillson had set fire to his eating-house in Boswell Court, London, with the intention of defrauding his insurer, but the judges acquitted him of this capital charge because the insurance was only evidenced by a memorandum rather than a policy, and was, therefore, void under the revenue statutes.​[27]​ 
3. Insurable Interest in Non-Life Policies​[28]​
A. Common Law
In the eighteenth century, a wager might be unenforceable - and, indeed, might give rise to criminal proceedings – as the result of legislation, or because it was contrary to morality or public policy, or injured a third party.​[29]​ Otherwise, ‘Indifferent wagers upon indifferent matters, without interest to either of the parties, are certainly allowed by the law of this country’.​[30]​ Nevertheless, the courts did distinguish wagers from insurance, even if the boundary was blurred by the practice of documenting wagers as insurance.​[31]​ On occasion the distinction appears to have been based on insurable interest. As early as 1692, it was said in a marine insurance case that, ‘the law is settled, that if a man has no interest, and insures, the insurance is void’ because ‘these insurances are made for the encouragement of trade, and not that persons unconnected in trade, nor interested in the ship, should profit by it’.​[32]​ In 1743 Lord Hardwicke denied a lessee’s claim under a fire policy after the lease expired: ‘If the insured was not to have a property at the time of the insurance or loss, any one might insure upon another’s house, which might have a bad tendency to burning houses.’​[33]​ He said, however, that the judges ‘winked’​[34]​ at those marine policies in which the parties agreed not to require proof of interest, as long as the intention was not to insist on the production of evidence rather than to insure irrespective of its existence.​[35]​ This was regarded as legitimate in marine ventures where distance meant the insured might not know whether a cargo had been sold or lost,​[36]​ but it does not seem to have been applied in non-marine insurance.​[37]​ 
	Cases on insurable interest were rare, and it is not always clear whether the judges were talking about the indemnity principle, or insurable interest. For example, in 1758, Lord Mansfield said, ‘Insurance was considered as an indemnity only, in case of a loss: and therefore the satisfaction ought not to exceed the loss. This rule was calculated to prevent fraud; lest the temptation of gain should occasion unfair and wilful losses.’​[38]​ The distinction is, of course, important if the lack of an insurable interest renders a policy void, since the indemnity principle merely restricts the claim. Some insurers were concerned about these issues, and began to deal with them through policy terms. For example, Sun Fire stipulated that those insuring property against fire should have an interest, and that any claim had to be supported by a certificate from a clergyman, churchwarden, or other local worthy confirming that the insured had suffered loss - in other words, that there had been a fire, and that the insured's property had been damaged.​[39]​
B. Marine Insurance Act 1746​[40]​
Writing forty years after the Marine Insurance Act was passed, James Park pronounced it, ‘the most important and most extensive in the whole code of statute law, with regard to insurances’.​[41]​ It rendered null and void policies on British ships, or goods carried on such ships, that were made ‘interest or no interest, or without proof of interest other than the policy, or by way of gaming or by way of wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the assurer’, unless the ship was a privateer.​[42]​ This ban seems significant given that only three years earlier Lord Hardwicke had said interest or no interest policies were common, and thought their use had been endorsed by the 1717 capital offence: 'New laws have been enacted, which make it felony to destroy ships, and the temptation to it has arisen from interest and no interest inserted in policies.'​[43]​
How did the act change the common law? For Lord Mansfield, ‘[it] implies, that in cases not specially prohibited by Act of Parliament, parties may wager or insure at pleasure’. He added, while it might be regrettable that wagers were not void, it ‘is now too late to discuss: they have too long and too often been held good and valid contracts.’​[44]​ Indeed, one of his most famous cases, Carter v Boehm,​[45]​ which clarified the duty of pre-contractual disclosure, involved an ‘interest or no interest’ non-marine policy.​[46]​ The failure in the act to define insurable interest gave the judges flexibility in relation to marine insurance. The courts regarded valued policies, which were policies where the parties agreed the amount payable in the event of loss,​[47]​ as commercially convenient, and enforced them, as long as the objective had not been to evade the act, and there was some interest, even if not to the extent stated in the policy.​[48]​ This issue split Parliament, however: a bill in 1741 would have expressly permitted valued policies where a bona fide estimate had been agreed with the underwriter, while another in 1748 would have banned them.​[49]​ Other exemptions were made explicit in the act. That for British privateers was to allow insurance of vessels for more than they were worth in anticipation of the prizes that might be captured,​[50]​ and a provision that permitted interest or no interest policies on goods from any Spanish or Portuguese dominion (s 3) was intended to encourage smuggling by British merchants.​[51]​ Most significant of all, the act did not require an insurable interest in a policy on a foreign ship. One explanation later advanced for this was ‘the difficulty of bringing witnesses from abroad to prove the interest’, although this was disputed by a commentator writing soon after the act,​[52]​ and a more plausible suggestion is that it arose from the belief that if fraud were made less likely by requiring an insurable interest, not requiring it would put foreign ships at risk to the advantage of British shipping. The economist, Corbyn Morris, was unimpressed. For him it seemed ‘as though it was of Concern, to prevent our being defrauded by each other, but that our being defrauded by Foreigners, was not to be interrupted’.​[53]​ 
	Why was the act passed in 1746? The usual explanation is that it was a reaction against wagering, but criticism of gambling was hardly new, so why legislate in 1746, and why only prohibit certain types of wager? The debates on the 1746 bill seem not to have survived, but Dr Johnson’s embellished account of the debate on a similar bill in 1741 reveals a split between those who thought the industry riddled with fraud, and that ‘interest is the parent of diligence’,​[54]​ and those who denied the existence of a culture of fraud, and, therefore, the need for insurable interest. The preamble to the act mentions both gambling and fraud, but it raises other issues.  
Whereas it hath been found by experience, that the making assurances, interest or not interest, or without further proof of interest than the policy, hath been productive of many pernicious practices, whereby great numbers of ships, with their cargoes, have either been fraudulently lost and destroyed, or taken by the enemy in time of war; and such assurances have encouraged the exportation of wooll,​[55]​ and the carrying on many other prohibited and clandestine trades, which by means of such assurances have been concealed, and the parties concerned secured from loss, as well to the diminution of the publick revenue, as to the great detriment of fair traders: and by introducing a mischievous kind of gaming or wagering, under the pretence of assuring the risque on shipping, and fair trade, the institution and laudable design of making assurance, hath been perverted; and that which was intended for the encouragement of trade and navigation, has in many instances, become hurtful of, and destructive to the same​[56]​ 
What made all these things so urgent seems to be that after 25 years of peace Britain had returned to war in 1739.​[57]​ It was primarily a naval conflict, which required entrepreneurs to transport supplies to the Navy, to engage in fighting as privateers, and to maintain international trade by evading blockades. Yet, that invites the question, why did the 1741 bill fail? The obvious explanation is that the entry of France into the war presented a more substantial and immediate threat than the original enemy, Spain, particularly given French support for the Jacobite Rebellion, which had brought Charles Stuart, grandson of the deposed James II, as far south as Derby, and was only been defeated in April 1746.
4. Insuring an Enemy and Reinsurance
A. Insuring an Enemy
Another reason for the failure of the 1741 bill was the controversy aroused by its inclusion of a clause that would have banned the underwriting of enemy ships, which was not illegal at common law.​[58]​ The London petitioned against the bill over this issue, and went on to pay Spanish and French policyholders £18,000 after the capture of ships by the British in 1746; although this was eclipsed in 1781 by payments from underwriters said to be around £3 million following Admiral Rodney's attack on St Eustatius during the Anglo-Dutch War.​[59]​ Such insurance was strongly defended. Some opposed any regulation.
I am never willing, Sir, to load Trade with Restraints; Trade is in its own Nature so fugitive and variable that no constant Course can be prescribed to it; and those Regulations which were proper when they were made, may in a few Months become Difficulties, and Obstructions... It is more prudent to leave the Merchants at Liberty to pursue those Measures which Experience shall dictate upon every Occasion, and suffer them to snatch the present Opportunity of honest Gain whenever it shall happen; they will never injure their own Interest by the Use of this Liberty, and by preserving the Nation from Detriment; nor will they need to be restrained by a Law proposed without their Solicitation, and of which they cannot discover any beneficial Consequences.​[60]​ 
It was argued that a prohibition would drive foreign merchants to insure abroad, benefit rival nations, and ‘throw such a Damp upon the Spirit of Insuring, as may totally extinguish it in this Nation.’​[61]​ The growth of the British economy was achievable only at the expense of rivals: ‘if our insurers gain by their practice, the [Spanish] must undoubtedly be losers.’​[62]​ This hints at the way that by the middle of the century insurance had acquired importance beyond supporting trade and war to become part of the development of London as an international finance centre that generated employment, foreign earnings, and tax revenue. Yet, the rejection of a ban on trading with the enemy was disputed. Aside from political and moral considerations, Morris argued that cutting off insurance would put the enemy under pressure and shorten the war,​[63]​ and Sir John Barnard MP thought there was some confusion as to the purpose of public policy since, ‘it is not uncommon for Merchants… to imagine their own Interest the Interest of the Nation.’ It was even suggested that underwriters might seek to protect insured vessels by assisting the enemy: ‘Suspicions have been held, that the French obtained Intelligence of the Stations of our Men of War from the British Insurers’.​[64]​ That point was contested by the Solicitor General, William Murray (later Lord Mansfield), who believed that insuring foreign ships ‘is a certain mode of obtaining intelligence of the enemy’s designs’.​[65]​
Eventually, a bill, which had been introduced by a Bristol merchant, was passed in 1748. This act rendered void insurance, or wagers on a French ship, or ships bound to France or French colonies, or cargoes on such ships, and the parties involved in the contract, including the broker, could be fined.​[66]​ The interest in this issue from Bristol merchants, who had also promoted the 1741 bill, seems to have been because they did not profit from underwriting, and they may have believed there would be gains if French trade were weakened by the loss of cover. Opposition within the London market may also have softened when the dangers posed by the limitations in the 1746 act were revealed by a fraud involving ‘Persons of Bayonne and Bourdeaux… fitting out Ships, and making large Insurances thereon, and then putting these Ships in the Way of being taken by the English.’​[67]​ Encouraged by the returns available during the war, underwriters had acted imprudently, and one estimate was that the fraud involved interest or no interest policies worth £100,000. In any event, the bill acquired influential supporters, including Lord Hardwicke LC, although Murray, and with him the Attorney General, Dudley Ryder, were unconvinced, continuing to fear the loss of insurance business.​[68]​ 
The act had a limited life because its terms provided that it would expire when hostilities ceased, and this occurred within a few months. When Murray was elevated to the bench he remained consistent with his earlier view, concluding that there was no general rule under which trading with the enemy was illegal because ‘several acts of parliament have been specially passed, in order to make such trading illegal, which proves that the legislature did not think it was so before.’​[69]​ The issue was raised again during subsequent wars without success, and the prohibition was not revived until the Traitorous Correspondence Act 1793. This was part of a nervous government’s fears about the spread of revolutionary politics following the French Revolution and the outbreak of war with France. By that time Mansfield had retired, and the judges took the view that, in spite of his views, trading (including insurance) with an enemy was illegal at common law.​[70]​ 
B. Reinsurance
Reinsurance was prohibited by the 1746 act.​[71]​ This ban was not limited to British policies,​[72]​ although it did not apply if the primary insurer was insolvent or dead, and the second policy was expressly stated to be a ‘re-assurance’ (s 4).​[73]​ Reinsurance had been used in the London market since at least the 1570s,​[74]​ but, while no reasons were given for the ban, there had been criticism. During the inquiry before the Bubble Act, there were complaints that reinsurance made claims more complex, and that it was arranged by brokers to boost premiums. But these critics were keen to draw an unfavourable comparison between the subscription market, which allowed reinsurance, and the proposed marine insurance companies, which would carry sufficient capital to make it unnecessary.​[75]​ It was suggested that the intention behind the 1746 act was to reinforce the ban on partnerships in the 1720 act, which otherwise could be avoided by a single underwriter reinsuring with a partnership.​[76]​ Writing closer to the time, Magens said the aim had been to outlaw the practice of underwriters ‘having their Friends abroad underwrite for them, and then re-insuring themselves at home at a lower Premium’,​[77]​ but, he added, this practice was abandoned when underwriters found themselves liable to pay abroad in circumstances that did not trigger liability under the reinsurance. The ban was, therefore, unnecessary, and it deprived ‘the London Insurers, without any just Reason, of the Liberty to re-insure themselves, when they have a Mind to discontinue their Risks’.​[78]​ On the other hand, some 30 years later Park supported the ban. He defined reinsurance as ‘a contract, which the first insurer enters into, in order to relieve himself from those risks which he has incautiously undertaken’.​[79]​ While acknowledging the widespread use of such policies in other countries, and that they were ‘productive of very beneficial consequences’, their abuse justified prohibition,​[80]​ although he did not specify the nature of these abuses. Millar also supported the ban because he believed underwriters only reinsured when they acquired some 'private knowledge' about an increase in the risk of loss.​[81]​ 
The impact of the prohibition may have been limited. As the market expanded, reinsurance became important in spreading risk, and in enlarging the underwriting capacity of the subscription and provincial markets.​[82]​ While the courts held that reinsurance was illegal, and premiums could not be recovered,​[83]​ they did not intervene where disputes on reinsurance had been referred to arbitrators,​[84]​ and permitted the substitution of an insurer in a primary policy, which became ‘a common occurrence'.​[85]​ The judges also blurred the distinction between reassurance and double insurance. While ‘a re-assurance is a contract made by the insurer to secure himself’,​[86]​ double insurance was ‘where the same man is to receive two sums instead of one, or the same sum twice over, for the same loss, by reason of his having made two insurances upon the same goods or the same ship.’​[87]​ In double insurance, an insured was limited to an indemnity, but people with different interests in the property could insure the whole value, and the insurer could recover a contribution from a non-paying insurer. Finally, in spite of the broad wording of the act, the ban was assumed to apply only to marine reinsurance. The law reports are littered with life reinsurance (known as cross insurance),​[88]​ life offices codified the practice of reinsuring policies above a certain value,​[89]​ and when he came to repeal the ban in 1864 Gladstone said, ‘I propose also to legalize the practice, universally established practice, although now an illegal one, of what is known as marine re-insurance.’​[90]​ 
5. Insurable Interest in Life Policies
A. Common law and the Life Assurance Act 1774
There appears to have been little concern about insurable interest in life policies before the middle of the eighteenth century. There was no case law. In Whittingham v Thornburgh,​[91]​ although the court cancelled a policy that lacked insurable interest, it seems to have done so not for that reason but because it was part of a fraudulent scheme. Early life cover typically permitted payment only to a defined category of beneficiary: for example, schemes involved a reversionary annuity that entitled the subscriber's widow to an annual payment, or membership schemes whereby payment was made to a subscriber's next of kin. Companies, such as the London and the Royal, which entered the life market in 1721, did open the possibilities of the policyholder specifying other beneficiaries, and of policies being taken out by people other than the insured life. These were typically for a one-year term with a fixed premium and a fixed benefit.​[92]​ But it was the Society of Equitable Assurances on Lives and Survivorship, which was established in 1762 and which, as will be seen, was based on a mathematical calibration of risk, that introduced a clear rule on insurable interest: ‘No person can make assurance upon the life of another, unless he make it appear... that he hath an interest in the life of such other person, at least equal to the sum which he proposes to assure.’​[93]​
	The Life Assurance Act 1774 renders null and void insurance on lives, or other events, ‘wherein the person or persons for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies shall be made, shall have no interest, or by way of gaming or wagering’ (s 1), ​[94]​ or if the person interested has not been noted on the policy (s 2).​[95]​ The act is not confined to life assurance, as indicated by its alternative title of the Gambling Act, but its precise scope is uncertain, except that insurance on ‘ships, goods and merchandises’ is expressly excluded (s 4).​[96]​ There is no definition of insurable interest. Lord Mansfield thought a limited financial interest was sufficient: ‘An interest is necessary, but no particular kind of interest is required. Master Holford’s insurance was not a legal interest’.​[97]​ He was referring to a policy, which had been enforced, as to whether a posthumous child was a son or daughter.​[98]​ A broad approach makes sense given that wagers were enforceable at common law, although section 3 states, ‘no greater sum shall be recovered... than the amount of the value of the interest’. This resembles the Equitable's rule, and suggests life policies were regarded as contracts of indemnity, which was the view taken by the court in Godsall v Boldero.​[99]​ 
B. The Origins of the Act
Why was the act passed? It is usually regarded as an expression of outrage against gambling. This is supported by the preamble: ‘it hath been found by experience that the making insurances on lives or other events wherein the assured shall have no interest hath introduced a mischievous kind of gaming’. More particularly, it is assumed that this outrage arose from the case of Earl of March v Pigot,​[100]​ which originated in a bet between two men on the duration of their fathers’ lives. By the 1770s, while life insurance might be individually negotiated in the subscription market, the growth was in standard form life policies offered by companies such as the Royal and the London, and, more recently, the Equitable. Wagers on lives, which were sometimes documented in the form of insurance policies, may have increased in the subscription market from the late 1740s as peace brought a drop in premiums for marine insurance. In 1755, Magens was complaining that, ‘People take the Liberty to make Insurances on any one’s Life without Exception; and the Insurers seldom enquire much if there are good or bad Reasons for such Insurance’.​[101]​ Shortly after Cunningham cautioned underwriters against writing policies without the consent of the insured life, and encouraged them to examine the motives of those taking out insurance.​[102]​ The split at Lloyd's in 1769, which led to the formation of the New Lloyd's Coffee House, was supposedly caused by disgust at gambling, although accusations followed the members,​[103]​ and it was argued in a wager case in 1777 that the act had been ‘expressly made to kick out of Lloyd’s Coffee House this and all other gambling policies’.​[104]​ 
One obvious problem with linking the act directly to Pigot is that the case was decided three years before it was rushed through Parliament in a matter of months. Moreover, one struggles to find expressions of outrage among the trial jurors, who enforced the wager, or the judges of the King’s Bench, who included Lord Mansfield, or in the newspapers,​[105]​ and the act did not address the issues in the case, since it neither banned wagering, nor even wagering on lives, but only wagering in the form of an insurance policy.​[106]​ In 1778, counsel in Da Costa v Jones supported a wager ‘upon the sex of Monsieur le Chevalier D’Eon’ by referring to the Pigot case: ‘What can be a greater violation of all decorum… and yet the case… was entertained, and solemnly adjudged in this Court… without a thought or idea of its being liable to any such objection.’​[107]​ Mansfield rejected the analogy, but on the basis that, while this wager injured a third party (D'Eon), the wager on the gamblers’ fathers had not.​[108]​ Some years later, Lord Ellenborough CJ called the Pigot wager ‘indecorous’ without doubting its legality, and it continued to be cited as authority on the effect of the event upon which a bet was laid having already occurred without the knowledge of either party.​[109]​ This is not to say the judges welcomed such practices. Lord Mansfield thought insurance ‘of great benefit to trade. But the use of it was perverted by its being turned into a wager.’​[110]​ In a case involving a wagering policy on Lord Northington, he attacked ‘in the strongest terms, all those gambling, sharping wagers, on insurance on lives, wherein the parties had no interest’.​[111]​ 
Although wagering policies played an important part in shaping the legislation, it is necessary to look elsewhere for an explanation as to why the act was passed in 1774. Richard Oliver, a City of London MP, introduced the bill.​[112]​ This, and the fact that it passed within two months without objection from the pre-1720 act companies,​[113]​ which were always sensitive to anything that might infringe their privileges, suggests the bill had the support of business interests. Its introduction appears to have been connected with a financial crash in 1772-73, which followed a brief but rapid economic boom that bore some resemblance to the period of speculation before the bursting of the South Sea Bubble. The crash began with the failure of the banker, Alexander Fordyce, rippling out to other banks, other parts of the economy, including underwriting, and other countries to become the worst crisis since 1720.​[114]​ As then, stock-jobbing was blamed, leading George Prescott, a banker, to introduce a bill ‘for preventing the infamous practice of stock-jobbing, and other species of gaming' in March 1773.​[115]​ At first, this was welcomed, with several newspapers taking the unusual step of reproducing the bill. It covered a range of issues, including a ban on wagers or insurances on the price of stocks and dividends, which had been highlighted during an inquiry into financial difficulties at the East India Company.​[116]​ The first version of the bill also prohibited life assurance. Oliver spoke in support of this, arguing that life insurance was ‘the scandal of our laws and of humanity’ and an encouragement to murder.​[117]​ This may have been a reaction not to the bets taken at Newmarket on the lives of Mr Pigot and Sir William Codrington, which the proposed bill would not have touched, but more recent publicity surrounding wagering policies on prominent public figures, including the duke of Chandos, Lord Northington, the Princess Dowager of Wales, and the duke of Gloucester.​[118]​ There was, however, opposition to an absolute ban because ‘insuring of lives is of vast benefit and utility to individuals’,​[119]​ and the bill was amended to resemble what became sections 1 and 3 of the 1774 act. 
Initial enthusiasm for the 1773 bill quickly turned to criticism. It was 'full of inconsistencies and absurdities', and 'a crude indigested bill',​[120]​ which can be appreciated by glancing at the extensive amendments made to the first draft. More importantly, while stock-jobbing was regarded as pernicious, there was little confidence that the bill would prevent it, and there was concern that interfering with the securities market might harm the government's ability to raise funds. In the end, the Lords rejected the bill without a division.​[121]​ Yet, there remained support for the provisions on life insurance. In March 1774, subscribers at Lloyd’s denounced, ‘making Speculative Insurance on the Lives of Persons’, arguing that it ‘is endangering the lives of the Persons so insured, from the Idea of being Selected from Society for that inhuman purpose, which is being Virtually an Accessory in a Species of Slow Murder’.​[122]​ The relevant sections were reshaped into the 1774 act. Some features of the 1773 bill were abandoned, notably the exceptions from the insurable interest requirements for policies on the insured’s own life, or the insured's spouse,​[123]​ parent, or child. The reason for these omissions is unclear. The original 1774 bill had not required an insurable interest in a policy on the insured's life, but this was removed, possibly because of the fear that such policies might encourage suicide, which was believed to be a particular problem among the English, and to have increased since the crash.​[124]​ 
C. Evading the act
At first, the act was broadly interpreted. Lord Mansfield applied it to wagering policies concerning Chevalier D'Eon,​[125]​ and trade with Maryland,​[126]​ while Buller J went further, saying that it extended to all wagers, irrespective of whether they were documented as insurance: 
For either the Courts must restrain that Act of Parliament to such cases as in form are policies, which would entirely repeal the statute; or, by pursuing the spirit of the Act, extend it to all cases. I think the latter is the true construction; for a policy is nothing but a promise. And it would be strange to determine that the party might do the same thing in one form, which the statute has expressly prohibited to be done in another.​[127]​
As late as 1832 Tindal CJ ruled that the act included a wagering policy on the price of certain shares, saying that the act’s purpose was, 'To prevent gambling under the form and pretext of a policy of insurance by parties who have no interest in the subject-matter of such assurance.'​[128]​ Other judges took a narrower view,​[129]​ and, although this prevailed the scope of the act has remained obscure.​[130]​ 
	Speculation survived in the life market.​[131]​ Brokers and underwriters were able to organize their business in ways that avoided the new law. In 1778, a broker frankly admitted before Lord Mansfield that a wagering policy was ‘not legal, but upon honour. No names [were] mentioned. The name in that kind of policy [is] never inserted. I did not consider the interest.’​[132]​ This split between law and practice can be seen most clearly in the line of cases that began with Godsall v Boldero,​[133]​ when the court ruled that an insurable interest was required at the dates of the policy and the claim. This presented difficulties. Life assurance involves a long-term commitment to make premium payments, which unemployment or sickness could interrupt, and, therefore, the ability to sell policies made them more attractive investments. The courts were persuaded to modify the law because, as Lord Tenterden CJ acknowledged in 1831, life offices were making payment irrespective of insurable interest at death: ‘after the trial of Godsall v Boldero the business of the office had suffered, and they had therefore changed their course of proceeding; and that if they were to make the enquiries supposed, they might as well shut their doors.’​[134]​ Since the act did not mention assignment, an assignee for value could stand in place of the assured, and claim on the policy,​[135]​ and, eventually, Godsall was overruled in Dalby v The India and London Life Assurance Co,​[136]​ with Alderson B observing that it 'seems not to have been acted upon by the offices', and that 'it could not have been carried to a court of error.'​[137]​ Yet, a note of caution should be added to this view of life offices as paying irrespective of insurable interest. The life market expanded dramatically in the first half of the nineteenth century, with 400 new offices,​[138]​ and not all of these were scrupulous in honouring their moral, or even their legal, commitments. This more cautious view is suggested by the various calamities and frauds in the sector, and by the apparent success of the London Indisputable Life Policy Company (1848), which was formed in response to a perception that life offices disputed liability on the grounds of misrepresentation, non-disclosure, breach of warranty, and lack of insurable interest at death.​[139]​ 
6. Opening the Marine Market
The oligopoly in marine insurance enjoyed by the subscription market, the Royal and the London survived until the early nineteenth century when higher premiums caused by the French wars created dissatisfaction among policyholders, and tempted new investors.​[140]​ A proposal in 1806 to incorporate a new marine insurer was rejected, but another in 1810 made a greater impact, perhaps because it seemed more substantial with £5 million in nominal capital, so that it has been called ‘a declaration of war on Lloyd’s’.​[141]​ The fear was that because some of the richest merchants supported the proposed company it would draw away both their business and their underwriting capital, and some members of Lloyd’s were sufficiently pessimistic to apply for shares in the new company. In the Commons, William Manning, who supported the petition for incorporation, wanted an inquiry, and the vigour of his attack on the privileges of Lloyd’s, the Royal, and the London seemed undiminished by his position as a director of the Bank of England, which enjoyed far greater rights. The Manning committee argued that the London and the Royal companies had not provided competition for the subscription market – only 4% of insurance stamp duty came from their marine policies​[142]​ - or made their promised payments to the Crown, and Lloyd’s underwriters were accused of being financially fragile, disputatious, and slow to settle claims. 
Nothing came of the report.​[143]​ It lacked clear recommendations, and it failed to reassure those who were unconvinced of the benefits of competition, and for whom the South Sea Bubble remained part of the collective memory: ‘The exclusive privileges of the chartered companies, and the restrictions against underwriting in partnership, are the great fences against the inroads of mercantile speculations’.​[144]​ Paradoxically, the war and the blockade of British shipping, which had prompted the challenge to the closed market, helped defeat reform. Echoing objections to the 1720 act, one broker said:
it is well worth the serious consideration of the Committee how materially it might affect the commercial interests of this country were the credit of Lloyd’s to be shaken in the opinion of Foreigners, which to the present time has been looked up to by the commercial world as an inexhaustible source of security and universal maritime information.​[145]​ 
The appointment of the Manning committee was, however, an acknowledgement of growing discontent over market restrictions, and, while an economic depression that followed the ending of the war in 1815 prevented an immediate return to the issue, it resurfaced during a boom in 1824. Thomas Fowell Buxton MP, a Brick Lane brewer more famous for campaigning against the slave trade, introduced his bill by asking, ‘What good reason could be given for confining [marine] insurances to one of two chartered companies, or to certain individuals at Lloyd’s?’​[146]​ He contrasted the restriction on marine insurance with the competition in life and fire insurance, and highlighted the inconvenience to provincial ship owners forced to apply to London underwriters. Insuring at Lloyd’s was also problematic because it often involved a number of underwriters whose identities were likely to be unknown to the policyholder, and who, when it came to making a claim, might be dead, or bankrupt, or litigious. This time there was no war, and the government favoured loosening restrictions on trade. To objections that the bill threatened Lloyd’s because the public would go wherever insurance was cheapest, the President of the Board of Trade, William Huskisson, simply responded, ‘And why… ought they not to be permitted to do so?’​[147]​ 
The bill passed,​[148]​ but it repealed only those parts of the 1720 act that rendered void policies issued by corporations, partnerships, and companies. Developments beyond insurance led to a broader act in 1825. The economic boom had led to the formation of a large number of companies, and when the share contracts were held to be illegal under the 1720 act, 297 petitions for incorporation were presented.​[149]​ The government rushed through the repeal, with the Attorney General revealing the new perspective by declaring the act ‘unintelligible’, and praising joint-stock companies as ‘the means of acquiring great wealth to the individuals connected with them, and also advantageous to the public.’​[150]​ The idea of fresh regulation was rejected. There had been only one prosecution under the old act,​[151]​ which was taken to indicate, ‘It had, in fact, become a dead letter; and he had therefore a right to conclude that no such law was necessary.’​[152]​ 
7. The Science of Insurance and Insurance law
The Bubble Act 1720, the Marine Insurance Act 1746, the Life Assurance Act 1774, and even the legislation on stamp duties were prompted by financial crises or war, but they were also shaped by longer-term changes in the economy and insurance. The new financial instruments and markets were clearly sources of risk, but they were essential to the economy and the state, and they were made respectable by the drawing of distinctions between speculation and risk transfer. The difference between insurance and wagering, which was, at best, blurred in 1700, became clearer by the end of the century. Magens advised merchants in 1755 that, if they follow 'reason, public spirit, probity and honour... they would not fall into so many strange inventions of unnatural and gaming insurance'.​[153]​ Insurance was a science involving the calculation of risk through algebra and logarithms, as Corbyn Morris confidently announced in An Essay Towards Illustrating the Science of Insurance (1747): 
[insurance is] so far from being justly reproachable as a Plan of Gaming, that it removes the Business of the Merchant from that State, and greatly reduces the Risk upon the whole; Dissipating it in such a manner, as to leave even the Insurer himself liable to little Hazard.​[154]​ 
The use of such calculations was not confined to marine insurance. Early premium life assurance had typically been for twelve months, was usually limited to people of less than 45 years of age, and carried a high fixed premium and a fixed benefit. A plausible tale has it that when denied a policy on account of his age, James Dodson, a mathematician whose work on annuities brought election to the Royal Society, set about devising a scheme in which premiums and benefits were adjusted to estimates of life expectancy based on age, health, gender, and occupation. His scheme took into account information about the individual, but also used mortality data, which had been collected by parish authorities, and a methodology drawn from key figures in the Scientific Revolution, such as Edmond Halley and Abraham de Moivre. Dodson's work led to the establishment of the Society of Equitable Assurances (1762), which rapidly became one of the largest life offices.​[155]​ Similar advances occurred in fire insurance. Early policies carried fixed premiums based on a simple distinction between brick and timber dwellings, and, generally, excluded manufactories, but in 1727 the Sun Fire Office devised a more sophisticated taxonomy that adjusted the range of buildings covered and the premiums charged to calculations of risk based on experience.​[156]​
	These developments brought important changes in insurance law. The first involved demonstrating that insurance law was based on a rational and coherent set of principles. Magens wrote of his hope for 'a complete Body of Laws with respect to Insurance, which is so greatly wanted here',​[157]​ Mansfield was anxious to establish 'rules, easily learned and easily retained',​[158]​ and Blackstone observed:
The learning relating to marine insurances hath of late years been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions, which have now established the law in such a variety of cases, that (if well and judiciously collected) they would form a very complete title in a code of commercial jurisprudence.​[159]​ 
He thought the task too difficult because each case rested on its particular facts, and, ‘it is not easy to reduce them to any general heads in mere elementary institutes.’​[160]​ Yet, in the second half of the eighteenth century several treatises attempted to unearth – or impose – a rational structure. In 1760, Timothy Cunningham published a useful - if rather unsystematic – account.​[161]​ Thomas Parker claimed to have been inspired to write his book in 1775 by Blackstone, and wisely applauded Mansfield, who ‘rendered the law so plain and clear’.​[162]​ Unlike these authors, John Weskett (1781) focused entirely on insurance law, but like them (and subsequent writers) he made extensive reference to foreign laws as exemplars of good practice because, as he lamented, ‘amongst all the maritime Nations of Europe', Britain alone lacked ‘a clear, intelligible, and well digested Code’.​[163]​ Others followed, most notably, James Park’s paean to Lord Mansfield (1787), Millar (1787), Burn (1801) and Marshall (1802).​[164]​
	There were changes in the substantive rules of insurance law, particularly in the elevation of risk calculation, which skewed the law by placing the main burdens on the policyholder, and by characterizing brokers as the servants of the policyholders rather than the underwriters with whom they had more frequent contact. Writing in 1781, John Weskett outlined the assumption underpinning this conception of the insurance contract: ‘it will rarely happen that he [the underwriter] is on an equal footing, as he ought to be, with the insured’.​[165]​ There is space here to note only some consequences of this. The first involves warranties: ‘a condition or a contingency, that a certain thing shall be done or happen, and unless that is performed, there is no valid contract.’​[166]​ They were seen as fundamental to the calculation of risk, and, therefore, the contract was avoided even if there was no connection between the breach and the loss. Not surprisingly, warranties became common features in policies. 
	Insurers also benefited from the duty of utmost good faith, which Lord Mansfield famously explained in Carter v Boehm: 
Insurance is a contract on speculation. The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only; the under-writer trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the under-writer into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque, as if it did not exist.​[167]​ 
The duty had originated in cases where the contract was vitiated for fraudulent concealment, but fraud was an uncertain concept, and, in Mansfield’s view, unnecessary:
Although the suppression should happen through mistake, without any fraudulent intention; yet still the under-writer is deceived, and the policy is void; because the risque run is really different from the risque understood and intended to be run, at the time of the agreement.​[168]​ 
Good faith bled into warranties, making a distinction difficult, particularly since the courts were prepared to imply warranties. In Ross v Bradshaw, Lord Mansfield held that where a life policy is written without any representation as to the person’s health, the insurer takes all the risk, ‘unless there was some fraud in the person insuring, either by his suppressing some circumstances which he knew, or by alleging what was false’.​[169]​ Such cases, therefore, turned on whether there was a warranty as to the health, and, if not, whether there had been a failure to disclose,​[170]​ although by 1772 it was said, ‘Nobody would underwrite without a warranty’.​[171]​ 
	Good faith and warranties were connected to the emerging doctrine of insurable interest, which was another aspect of the distinction between insurance and gaming contracts. As has been seen, the Equitable, which led the way on risk calculation in life insurance, incorporated a rule on insurable interest into its policies. An insurance policy involved the transfer of a mathematically measurable risk that arose out of the policyholder’s interest in the subject matter, and that interest meant the policyholder was presumed to have better knowledge of the risk, which should, therefore, be disclosed, either through the duty of good faith, or because of warranties. In a wager, on the other hand, the risk arose out of the contract, which meant that (in theory) both parties had equal access to knowledge of that risk, and no disclosure was required.​[172]​ 
	The importance attached to interest was bound up with broader changes in attitudes to commerce and finance. Professor Hirschman argued that around this time the concept of interest was redefined in ways that accommodated the new economy. He quoted Claude Helvétius, the eighteenth-century philosopher: 'As the physical world is ruled by the laws of movement so is the moral universe ruled by laws of interest.'​[173]​ Hirschman contended that self-love and reason, which were regarded as the principal categories of human motivation but had appeared to pull in different directions, were now combined by a rearticulation of the idea of interest: 'as the passion of self-love upgraded and contained by reason, and as reason given direction and force by that passion.'​[174]​ Self-interest became a positive force rather than a vice. As long as it was restrained by reason from turning into greed and speculation, interest enabled a distinction to be made between good and bad risk taking - good and bad both for the risk takers and for the nation.
	
8. Another History of Insurance Law

In 1747, Corbyn Morris wrote of insurance as 'that Aid, whereby the national Commerce is supported', so that while those who engaged in this business were often criticized as 'mean, and void of all Dignity, I cannot but esteem it highly meritorious, and honorable; For it can never justly be deemed a mean Profession to intercept the Calamities of the industrious Merchant, and to give Security to all his worthy Pursuits.'​[175]​ By the time he wrote this, the significance of the insurance industry in public policy came not only from its role in supporting commercial ventures but also because it was seen as an instrument of war and a source of revenue, and most importantly, because it had emerged from the debacle of the South Sea Bubble as one of the strongest parts of a new economy based on new types of financial instruments, which was making London into an international financial centre. All of this drew the attention of Parliament and the courts. 
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